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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB 2 7 2006 
M A R K L. S H U R T L E F F 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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February 27, 2006 
Ms. Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
Office of the Clerk 
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Re: State v. Casper Michael Dunkel, III, No. 20040875-CA 
Utah R. App. R. 24(i) Supplemental Authority Letter 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
Pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State cites State v. 
Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, 125 P.3d 938, in support of the State's argument that defendant 
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
This matter is set for oral argument tomorrow morning, Tuesday, February 28, 
2006. The State requests that this letter and the attached decision be distributed to the 
Court as supplemental authority. 
Sincerely, 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
enclosure 
cc: John T. Caine (faxed) 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, SIXTH FLOOR • P.O. 140854 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854 • TEL: (801) 366-0180 • FAX: (801) 366-0167 
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Briefs and Other Related Documents 
Supreme Court of Utah 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v 
Tanja RYNHART, Defendant and Respondent 
No. 20040115. 
Nov 22, 2005 
Background: Defendant was charged with 
possession of controlled substance within 1000 feet 
of public structure and possession of drug 
paraphernalia The First District Court, Bngham 
City Department, Ben H Hadfield, J , denied 
defendant's motion to suppress On defendant's 
petition for interlocutory appeal, the Court of 
Appeals, 81 P 3d 814, reversed 
Holdings: On grant of State's petition for writ of 
certiorari, the Supreme Court, Parrish, J , held that 
(1) m those instances where the State defends the 
legality of a search based on a theory of 
abandonment, the State must establish that the 
defendant abandoned her expectation of privacy m 
her property by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and 
(2) defendant did not retain any legitimate 
expectation of privacy m her van or purse, which 
were found by police officei investigating one-car 
accident, and thus such items weie abandoned and 
could be searched without wan ant 
Decision of Court of Appeals reversed, case 
lemanded 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €=>1011 
llOklOll Most Cited Cases 
On ceitioran, Supieme Court leviews the Court of 
Appeals' decision for correctness, focusing on 
whether that court correctly reviewed the trial 
court's decision under the appropriate standard of 
review 
[2] Criminal Law €^ =>l 134(3) 
llOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision 
concerning the constitutionality of a search and 
seizure for correctness, applying no 
defeience to the tiial court's legal conclusion 
U S C A Const Amend 4 
[3] Searches and Seizures €^>195.1 
349kl95 1 Most Cited Cases 
In those instances where the State defends the 
legality of a search based on a theory of 
abandonment, the State must establish that the 
defendant abandoned her expectation of privacy m 
her property by a preponderance of the evidence 
U S C A Const Amend 4 
[4] Abandoned and Lost Property €^1 .1 
lkl 1 Most Cited Cases 
Question of abandonment m property law sense is 
whether the owner has voluntarily, intentionally, 
and unconditionally relinquished his interest in the 
property so that another, having acquired 
possession, may successfully assert his superior 
interests 
[5] Abandoned and Lost Property €>^ >4 
lk4 Most Cited Cases 
To piove abandonment m the property law context, 
one typically must establish it by clear, unequivocal, 
and decisive evidence 
[6] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8 
349k28 Most Cited Cases 
In the law of seaich and seizuie, the question of 
abandonment is whether the defendant has, m 
discaidmg the pioperty, relinquished his reasonable 
expectation of privacy so that its seizure and search 
' 2006 Thomson/West No Claim to One; U S Govt Works 
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is reasonable within the limits of the Fourth 
Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[7] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8 
349k28 Most Cited Cases 
[7] Searches and Seizures €^161 
349kl61 Most Cited Cases 
The doctrine of abandonment, as applied in search 
and seizure contexts, is akin to the issue of standing 
because a defendant lacks standing to complain of 
an illegal search or seizure of property which has 
been abandoned. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[8] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8 
349k28 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant did not retain any legitimate expectation 
of privacy in her van or purse, which were found by 
police officer investigating one-car accident, and 
thus such items were abandoned and could be 
searched without warrant; officer was not 
confronted with any facts that suggested that 
defendant intended to retain her privacy interest in 
her purse or van, as defendant did not secure her 
vehicle, inform either the property owner or the 
police of the accident, or take her purse with her 
when she left the scene, but rather left her purse in 
the unlocked van for more than five hours, 
acknowledging her interest in the property only 
after the search had been completed and the van had 
been towed to a wrecking yard. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
[9] Searches and Seizures €^>24 
349k24 Most Cited Cases 
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and 
thus violate the Fourth Amendment unless 
undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[10] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8 
349k28 Most Cited Cases 
A warrantless search or seizure of abandoned 
property is not unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment because an individual who has 
abandoned her property voluntarily forfeits any 
expectation of privacy in that property. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
[11] Searches and Seizures €=>28 
349k28 Most Cited Cases 
In determining whether the State has established 
abandonment of property, thus justifying a 
warrantless search and seizure, a court must ask 
whether the owner of the property has retained an 
expectation of privacy in the object that society 
would recognize as objectively reasonable. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[12] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8 
349k28 Most Cited Cases 
Question of whether one has an expectation of 
privacy in item for purposes of determining whether 
object has been abandoned, thus justifying 
warrantless search and seizure, is a question of 
intent which may be inferred from words, acts, and 
other objective facts. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[13] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8 
349k28 Most Cited Cases 
A property owner need not intend to permanently 
relinquish ownership or possession to forfeit a 
reasonable expectation of privacy for item to be 
considered abandoned, thus justifying warrantless 
search and seizure of such 
item; rather, she need only leave an item unsecured 
in a public place. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[14] Searches and Seizures €^>28 
349k28 Most Cited Cases 
When determining whether a property owner has an 
expectation of privacy in an object or place to be 
searched, which is test applied to determine whether 
such object or place has been abandoned to justify 
warrantless search and seizure, the property owner's 
subjective intent is only one of the factors to be 
considered; ultimately, the test is whether the 
external manifestations of the property owner's 
intent would lead a reasonable person to believe 
that the property owner had voluntarily abandoned 
any legitimate privacy interest in the object or place 
to be searched. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
*940 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christine Soltis 
, Marian Decker, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff. 
James M. Retallick, Ogden, for defendant. 
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On Ceitioran to the Utah Court of Appeals 
PARRISH, Justice 
INTRODUCTION 
**1 Tanja Rynhart was arrested and charged with 
possession of a controlled substance after police 
officers discovered a small bag of cocaine in her 
purse At the time of the discovery, Rynhart's purse 
was in her van, which she had left unattended in a 
marsh after driving off the road and crashing 
through two fences Rynhait filed a motion to 
suppress the cocaine, arguing that the police officer 
illegally searched her van m violation of her lights 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution The State argued that the 
search was valid because Rynhart had abandoned 
her van Alternatively, it relied on the emergency 
aid doctrine The district court concluded that the 
search was not justified under the doctrine of 
abandonment, but nonetheless denied Rynhart's 
motion, holdmg that the emergency aid doctrine 
applied Rynhart sought interlocutory review of the 
district court's order with the court of appeals, 
which reversed, holding that the search could not be 
upheld under either doctrine Because we conclude 
that Rynhart abandoned any reasonable expectation 
of privacy m her van and purse, we hold that the 
seaich was permissible under the abandonment 
doctime Accordingly, we reverse 
BACKGROUND 
**2 At 8 30 a m on Sunday, January 6, 2002, a 
Bngham City police officer was called to the scene 
of a single-vehicle accident Upon arriving, the 
officer observed that a van, which was then located 
m the middle of a privately owned field, had 
traveled "over the curb, down an embankment, 
[and] through two fences" before coming to rest m 
the field Because the tire tracks were covered with 
fleshly fallen snow, the officer deduced that the 
accident occurred prior to the snowfall, which had 
begun appioximately five hours earlier 
**3 The officei approached the van and opened a 
door to determine whether anyone was still inside 
Although the officer did not see anyone in the van, 
he did obseive a pmse, a buefcase, and a partially 
© 2006 Thomson/West No 
consumed bottle of vodka When he opened the 
purse, he discovered a wallet containing nearly 
$330 in cash, Rynhart's driver's license, and "a 
small bag that had a white powdery substance m it " 
**4 The officer attempted to reach Rynhart by 
phone, but was unsuccessful Thereafter, the owner 
of the field in which the van had come to rest spoke 
to the officer, requesting the van's removal so that 
he could begin to repair the damaged fences 
Accordingly, just prior to 10 00 a m , the officer 
had the van towed to a wrecking yaid The officer 
remained at the scene for a short time thereafter, but 
Rynhart did not return At approximately 2 00 p m 
that same day, the towing company notified the 
officer that Rynhart had arrived to arrange for the 
retrieval of her van The officer met Rynhart at the 
wrecking yaid and inquired about the small bag 
found m her purse Rynhart admitted that the 
substance was cocaine She was subsequently 
arrested and charged with possession of a controlled 
substance, a second *941 degree felony, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor 
**5 Prior to trial, Rynhart moved to suppress the 
evidence seized as a result of the warrantless search 
of her van and purse She argued that the search 
violated both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions because "[t]he officer lacked any 
justification to search the vehicle pursuant to any 
public safety or warrantless search exception" The 
State responded by arguing that the seaich was 
constitutional under either one or both of two 
theories (1) the abandonment doctrine, and (2) the 
emeigency aid doctrine Pursuant to State v Rowe, 
806 P2d 730 (Utah CtApp 1991), lev'd on other 
pounds, 850 P 2d 427 (Utah 1992), the district 
court rejected the State's theory that Rynhart 
abandoned hei privacy expectation in the van, 
declaimg that "[t]he appaient eaily hour, the winter 
conditions, and the single vehicle nature of the 
accident all combine to belie the officer's imputing 
an intent to abandon the vehicle " The district court 
upheld the constitutionality of the search, however, 
under the emergency aid doctime 
**6 On September 23, 2002, Rynhart filed a 
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petition for interlocutory appeal, which the court of 
appeals granted. The court of appeals reversed the 
district court, holding that the emergency aid 
doctrine did not apply. State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT 
App 410, If 15, 81 P.3d 814. The court of appeals 
also held that the search could not be upheld under 
the abandonment doctrine, stating that 
the State suggests that we should, without the 
benefit of a cross-appeal, reverse the [district] 
court's ruling that Rynhart had not abandoned her 
expectation of privacy in her vehicle. Not only 
does the record offer scant support for that 
proposition, it offers no support whatsoever that 
Rynhart abandoned her expectation of privacy in 
her purse and the contents thereof, or her wallet 
and the contents thereof. 
Id. If 9 n. 3 (emphasis added). 
**7 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Thorne 
embraced the State's position, concluding that 
Rynhart had abandoned any privacy interest she 
may have had in the van and the purse when she 
"left the vehicle, and its contents, illegally parked 
and unsecured for several hours following her 
accident." Id. ^ 32. Additionally, Judge Thorne 
criticized the rule of law applied by the majority, as 
articulated in State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, 
If 14, 76 P.3d 178, and Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736, 
which requires the State to prove by "clear, 
unequivocal and decisive evidence" that Rynhart 
intended to abandon her privacy interest in the 
property. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, \ 24 n. 4, 
81 P.3d 814. According to Judge Thome, this 
"abandonment standard" is flawed and should be 
rejected. Id. % 39. 
**8 The State petitioned this court for a writ of 
certiorari, presenting the question for review as 
follows: "Did [Rynhart] retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her minivan and its 
contents when she left the vehicle wrecked and 
unlocked on another's property without reporting 
the single-car accident to either the police or the 
property owner?" We granted the State's petition 
and have jurisdiction pursuant to section 
78-2-2(3)(a) of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann § 
78-2-2(3)(a) (2002). 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2] **9 "On certiorari, we review the court of 
appeals' decision for correctness, focusing on 
whether that court correctly reviewed the [district] 
court's decision under the appropriate standard of 
review." Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, \ 8, 116 
P.3d 290 (internal quotations omitted). An 
appellate court reviews a district court's decision 
concerning the constitutionality of a search and 
seizure for correctness, applying no deference to the 
district court's legal conclusion. See State v. 
Markland, 2005 UT 26, ffl[ 7-9, 112 P.3d 507. 
**10 In this case, the court of appeals suggested 
that the issue of abandonment was not properly 
before it because the State did not file a 
cross-appeal. But this court has recognized that 
an appellate court may affirm the judgment 
appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even 
though such ground or theory differs from that 
stated by the [district] court to be the basis of its 
ruling or action, *942 and this is true even though 
such ground or theory is not urged or argued on 
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower 
court, and was not considered or passed on by the 
lower court. 
First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 
UT 56, If 11, 52 P.3d 1137. Because the doctrine 
of abandonment was apparent on the record and 
was, in fact, considered by the district court and 
raised in the State's brief to the court of appeals, it 
was properly before the court of appeals and is 
properly before us. 
ANALYSIS 
**11 The State identifies two alleged deficiencies 
in the court of appeals' analysis. First, the State 
asserts that the court of appeals erred when it 
required the State to prove abandonment by clear 
and convincing evidence. Second, the State argues 
that the court of appeals erred when it applied an 
abandonment test that focuses solely on a 
defendant's subjective intent. We address each 
issue in turn. 
**12 Before beginning our analysis, we pause to 
note that "federal Fourth Amendment protections 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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may differ from those guaranteed our citizens by 
our state constitution." Brigham City v. Stuart, 
2005 UT 13, H 10, 122 P.3d 506; see also State v. 
DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, % 12, 996 P.2d 546 ("While 
this court's interpretation of article I, section 14 has 
often paralleled the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we have 
stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah 
Constitution a different construction where doing so 
will more appropriately protect the rights of this 
state's citizens."). But because neither party has 
adequately analyzed the state constitutional claim as 
an issue separate and distinct from its federal 
counterpart, we will not address it. See Stuart, 
2005 UT 13, H 14, 122 P.3d 506 ("Because we are 
resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional 
issues which have not been properly preserved, 
framed and briefed, we are once again foreclosed 
from undertaking a principled exploration of the 
interplay between federal and state protections of 
individual rights without the collaboration of the 
parties to an appeal." (citations omitted)); Midvale 
City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, % 75, 73 P.3d 
334 ("Without analysis, the court can make no 
informed decision regarding whether the state 
constitutional provision in question was intended to 
mirror its federal counterpart, or whether it was 
intended to expand the scope of First Amendment 
guarantees."). Accordingly, our analysis in this 
case turns only on federal Fourth Amendment 
principles. 
I. BURDEN OF PROOF 
[3] **13 We first address the State's contention 
that the court of appeals erred in applying an 
incorrect burden of proof. In its opinion, the court 
of appeals cited State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 
256, 76 P.3d 178, as its basis for holding that 
Rynhart did not abandon her expectation of privacy. 
State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, f 9 n. 3, 81 
P.3d 814. In Bissegger, the court of appeals held 
that the State must prove abandonment by "clear, 
unequivocal and decisive evidence." 2003 UT App 
256, 1) 14, 76 P.3d 178 (citation omitted). The 
State contends that the court of appeals departed 
from traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
by applying that burden of proof We agree. 
© 2006 Thornsc )ii/W« ;st. No CI 
[4][5] **14 When considering whether an 
individual has abandoned property for puiposes of 
the Fourth Amendment, it is "critical" to recognize 
the "distinction between abandonment in the 
property-law sense and abandonment in the 
constitutional sense." City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 
306 Minn. 337, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370 (1975), 
quoted in 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
2.6(b), at 671 (4th ed.2004). "In the law of 
property, the question ... is whether the owner has 
voluntarily, intentionally, and unconditionally 
relinquished his interest in the property so that 
another, having acquired possession, may 
successfully assert his superior interest." Id. To 
prove abandonment in the property law context, one 
typically must establish it by clear, unequivocal, and 
decisive evidence. See Linscomb v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., 199 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir.1952) 
("Proof of abandonment must be *943 made by the 
one asserting it by clear, unequivocal and decisive 
evidence."). 
[6] **15 Conversely, 
[i]n the law of search and seizure, ... the question 
is whether the defendant has, in discarding the 
property, relinquished his reasonable expectation 
of privacy so that its seizure and search is 
reasonable within the limits of the Fourth 
Amendment. In essence, what is abandoned is 
not necessarily the defendant's property, but his 
reasonable expectation of privacy therein. 
Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d at 371 (emphasis added) 
(citations and footnote omitted). And whereas in 
the property law context one must prove 
abandonment by clear, unequivocal, and decisive 
evidence, the burden of proof in the Fourth 
Amendment context is much lower. 
**16 When addressing the burden of proof to be 
applied in search and seizure cases, the United 
States Supreme Court has declared that "the 
controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings 
should impose no greater burden than proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence." United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 
L,Ed.2d 242 (1974); see also Lego v. Twomey, 404 
U.S. 477, 488, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) 
("[W]e are unconvinced that merely emphasizing 
a iHi to Oris. U.S. Govt. W orks. 
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the importance of the values served by exclusionary 
rules is itself sufficient demonstration that the 
Constitution also requires admissibility to be proved 
beyond reasonable doubt [ ] [N]o substantial 
e\idence has accumulated that federal rights have 
suffered fiom determining admissibility by a 
preponderance of the evidence " (footnote omitted)) 
**17 We acknowledge that jurisdictions have 
disagreed on the appropriate burden of proof to 
apply in those cases m which the prosecution raises 
abandonment m defending the lawfulness of a 
search and seizure Compaie Friedman v United 
States 347 F 2d 697, 704 (8th Cir 1965) ("Proof of 
abandonment must be made by the one asserting it 
by clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence" 
(citation omitted)), with United States v Pitts 322 
F3d 449, 456 (7th Cir2003) ("To demonstrate 
abandonment the government must prove by a 
prepondeiance of the evidence that the defendant 
relinquished his property mteiests in the item to be 
searched ') We conclude, however, that the 
distinction between the concept of abandonment m 
property law and in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment supports application of the burden of 
proof geneially applicable to motions to suppress 
Accordingly, m those instances where the State 
defends the legality of a search based on a theory of 
abandonment, the State must establish that the 
defendant abandoned her expectation of privacy m 
her property by a preponderance of the evidence 
See Lego 404 U S at 488-89, 92 S Ct 619, 
Matlock 415 U S at 177 n 14, 94 S Ct 988 
[7] **18 We find support for this conclusion in the 
fact that the preponderance of the evidence standard 
applies in evaluating the standing of an individual 
seeking to challenge the validity of a search See 
United States v Cantley 130 F 3d 1371, 1377 
(10th Cirl997) (The burden was thus on [the 
defendant] to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that [he] was peisonally aggneved by the 
alleged seaich and seizure because it invaded [his] 
subjective expectation of privacy which society is 
prepared to lecogmze as reasonable" (some 
alterations m original) (internal quotations 
omitted)) Trie doctrine of abandonment, as applied 
m search and seizuie contexts, 'is akin to the issue 
© 2006 Thomson/West No 
of standing because a defendant lacks standing to 
complain of an illegal search or seizure of propeity 
which has been abandoned" United States v 
Gaizon 119 F 3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir 1997) In 
other words, a defendant who has abandoned 
particular property has lost any privacy interest in 
that property and lacks standing to challenge 
searches or seizures of that property The burden of 
proof used to evaluate standing should also be 
applied in those cases in which the doctrine of 
abandonment is asserted as a justification for a 
warrantless search and seizure Consequently, to 
justify the warrantless search in this case, the State 
need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Rynhart abandoned her expectation of 
privacy in her van and purse 
*944 II THE ABANDONMENT TEST 
[8][9] [10] **19 Having identified the level of 
proof by which the State must establish 
abandonment, we turn to the elements of the 
abandonment test The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated " U S Const 
amend IV "Warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable" and thus violate the Fourth 
Amendment "unless undertaken pursuant to a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement" 
State v Bwwn 853 P 2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) 
But "a warrantless search or seizure of abandoned 
property is not unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment" because an individual who has 
abandoned her pioperty voluntarily "forfeit[s] any 
expectation of privacy" m that property United 
States v Tumble 986 F 2d 394, 399 (10th Cir 1993) 
(emphasis added) 
**20 In this case, the court of appeals lehed on 
State v Bisseggei 2003 UT App 256, 76 P 3d 178, 
to support its conclusion that 'Rynhart never 
'voluntarily relinquished a leasonable expectation of 
privacy' and, accoidmgly, did not abandon her 
expectation of pnvacy m her vehicle or m its 
contents" State v Rynhait 2003 UT App 410, \ 
9 n 3, 81 P 3d 814 (quoting Bisseggei 2003 UT 
App 256, H 14, 76 P 3d 178) In Bisseggei the 
to Oris U S Govt Woiks 
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court of appeals lehed on State v Rowe, 806 P 2d 
730 (Utah CtAppl991), lev'd on othei grounds, 
850 P2d 427 (Utah 1992), m describing the 
doctrine of abandonment The Bissegger court 
declared "Determining whether abandonment 
occurred is 'primarily a factual question of intent to 
voluntarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy' Thus, the abandonment determination 
involves two inquiries (1) whether the individual 
lelmquished a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the item, and (2) whether the relinquishment was 
voluntary" 2003 UT App 256, f 14, 76 P 3d 178 
(quoting Rowe 806 P 2d at 736) Additionally, in 
Rowe, the comt of appeals stated that abandonment 
"is measured from the vantage point of the 
defendant, and not the police It is only the 
[defendant's] state of mind that counts " 806 P 2d 
at 736 (alteration in original) (internal quotations 
and citation omitted) 
[11][12][13][14] **21 The State argues that the 
court of appeals' formulation of this test constitutes 
error We agree The "test of abandonment 
subsumes both a subjective and objective 
component" United States v Gaizon, 119 F 3d 
1446, 1449 (10th Or 1997) Accoidmgly, to 
determine whether the State has established 
abandonment, a court must ask whether the property 
owner has retained an expectation of privacy m the 
object that society would recognize as objectively 
reasonable See United States v Bwbage 365 F 3d 
1174, 1178 (10th Cir2004), ceit denied, 543 US 
993, 125 SCt 510, 160 LEd2d 381 (2004), 
United States v Austin 66 F 3d 1115, 1118 (10th 
Crr 1995) " 'An expectation of privacy is a 
question of intent which may be inferred from 
words, acts, and other objective facts f " Austin 66 
F 3d at 1118 (quoting United States v Hernandez 1 
F3d 944, 947 (10th Cn 1993)) A property owner 
need not intend to permanently lelmquish 
ownership or possession to forfeit a leasonable 
expectation of pnvacy, she need only leave an item 
unsecuied m a public place See California v 
Gieenwood 486 U S 35, 40, 108 SCt 1625, 100 
LEd2d 30 (1988), United States v Barlow 17 
F3d 85, 88 (5th Cir 1994) When determining 
whether a piopeity ownei has an expectation of 
privacy, the pioperty owner's subjective intent is 
© 2006 Thomson/West No 
only one of the factois to be considered 
Ultimately, the test is whether the external 
manifestations of the property owner's intent would 
lead a reasonable person to believe that the property 
owner had voluntarily abandoned any legitimate 
privacy interest m the object or place to be searched 
**22 Were this a case with disputed facts, we 
would remand with instructions that the trier of fact 
consider the State's abandonment defense in light of 
the legal principles enumerated herem Because the 
facts in this case are not m dispute, however, we 
will simply proceed with the analysis 
**23 Applying the test articulated above, we 
conclude that Rynhart had no expectation of privacy 
in either her van or her purse We base this 
conclusion on the facts available to the searching 
officer In this case, the *945 searching officer was 
not confronted with any facts suggesting that 
Rynhart intended to retain her pnvacy interest in her 
purse or van Rynhart did not secure her vehicle, 
inform either the property owner or the police of the 
accident, or take her purse with her when she left 
the scene Instead, she left her purse m the 
unlocked van for more than five hours, 
acknowledging her interest m the property only 
after the search had been completed and the van had 
been towed to a wrecking yard Even if Rynhart 
had intended to retain an expectation of pnvacy in 
her van and purse, we would nevertheless conclude 
that she abandoned her property for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment because any such expectation is 
not one that society would recognize as objectively 
reasonable under the facts presented here By 
leaving her van and purse at the scene of an 
accident without any indication that she intended to 
return, Rynhart rendeied any subjective expectation 
of privacy objectively unieasonable We conclude 
that Rynhart abandoned her van and purse and, 
consequently, foifeited any pnvacy expectation m 
those objects Accordingly, the officer's search of 
her van and purse did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment 
CONCLUSION 
**24 We hold that the court of appeals ened in 
requiring the State to prove abandonment by clear, 
to Oii$ U S Govt Woiks 
p //print westlaw com/delivery htmPdest=atp&fonnat=HTMLE&dataid=A005580000 02/27/2006 
125P.3d938 
125 P.3d 938, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 63, 2005 UT 84 
(Cite as: 125 P.3d 938, 2005 UT 84) 
unequivocal, and decisive evidence. The burden of 
proof applicable in Fourth Amendment cases in 
which the State asserts abandonment is the burden 
of proof applied to motions to suppress generally— 
preponderance of the evidence. The court of 
appeals further erred in focusing solely on Rynhart's 
subjective intent. The appropriate test for 
determining whether a property owner has 
relinquished her expectation of privacy subsumes 
both an objective and a subjective component. 
Because we conclude that Rynhart did not intend to 
retain any expectation of privacy in her purse and 
van and that, even if she had, any such intent was 
not objectively reasonable, we hold that the court of 
appeals erred in suppressing the evidence obtained 
through the search of Rynhart's van. 
**25 We therefore reverse and remand to the court 
of appeals for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
**26 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief 
Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, and Justice 
Nehring concur in Justice Parrish's opinion. 
125 P.3d 938, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 63, 2005 UT 84 
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